



‘He says indifferently and alike –
how are you, friend?’
(Walt Whitman, 1881)1
horse sense
To grasp what is at stake one must be prepared to accept three propositions: First, that friendship is neither a gift bestowed nor an object of contemplation. Quite the 
reverse, friendship entails an economy of logic and gift exchange built of a wholly differ-
ent order, imbued, as we shall see below, with a certain kind of attunement (-listening), 
a certain kind of reaching out (-event); a certain kind of response (-ability), a certain 
kind of respect (-fullness), and a certain kind of play (-time), all diffractively generated 
without a single string attached. It is strictly born from the senses, and more than that, 
from a kind of exquisite, erotic, inhabited logic of the senses. Second, that this logic of 
the senses is in and of itself both radically heterogeneous and wildly singular – an all-
in-one instant – where ‘instant’ names a durational moment, whose duration is itself 
the thick, sensuous embodiment of energy, of quietude, of fl ow, exchange and intensity. 
In this sense, too, friendship sidesteps the proverbial issue of betrayal (as in the lament 
‘O my friends, there are no friends’) and offers up instead something more delicate, 
more delicious and indeed infi nitely more durable.2 Third, that it (friendship) knows no 
bounds, though, paradoxically, this pluralised ‘it’ only exists as an entangled encoun-
ter of embodied exchange. For this is a profound, supple, being-with-together whose 
togetherness (belonging) is itself simultaneously emboldened by the equally profound 
simplicity of its ability to enable the subjective/gerund’s ‘just be’/‘just being’ of aloneness 
as a treasured, solitary intra-independence.
This entangled encounter fi nds particularly strong resonance with the fi eld of 
animal studies. For the move away from an anthropocentric agency of Self:Other 
expresses a queer economy of sorts, one that enables a kind of ‘together-apartness’ 
in each other’s company without, in so being ‘apart-together’, becoming an all-exclu-
sive, cannibalising, co-dependent unity of One. Nor does this entangled encounter 
trade in exclusion, with familiar collateral damage consequences summarised by the 
words ‘uninvited’, ‘untouchable’, ‘excommunicated’, ‘illegal’ or ‘Other’. Instead this 
is a being/belonging suppleness (of encounter) that ‘enables’. It is never granted nor 
received. It simply ‘is’. It requires nothing of identity politics, selfhood, social agency, 
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though its very expression enables and indeed solidifi es all this and more. At its core 
is an ability to harness a particular type of raw energy, a raw sexual presence, even 
joy – an athleticism, respect, trust, odd form of mastery and slowness of time, one 
that not only goes beyond the traditional (and anthropomorphically bound) tropes of 
‘fraternity’, but beyond the linguistic turn itself, with all the trappings of ‘subject’ and 
‘object’, the becoming-x’s or transcendental why’s of the world, now thrown to one 
side. In so doing, a form of consciousness and indeed a (somewhat) new form of com-
munication is enabled, one that speaks a wholly different language game; one that is 
embodied in the brea(d)th and fractal singularities that today go under such headings 
as quantum entanglements, ana-materialisms, incompletenesses and undecidabilities.3
One could say at the outset, then, that friendship is a kind of sticky belonging, 
a cohesive, raw ‘blood poetics’ whose very re-cognise-ability, whose very response-
ability, is best expressed at the moment of its strange-cohesive together-apartness of 
encounter, mired in the senses, multiversal in its duration and relationally, expressively 
‘alive’ in its being-with/apart. In this context, too, friendship manages also (and conse-
quently) to maintain a shelf-life quite beyond the immediacy of its encountering. Not 
unlike the star, it can be observed, felt, shared, relived a billion light-years after the 
very encounter from which it was birthed has gone to black, vacuumed against that 
event horizon we might wish to call, at its most direct point: extinguished.
Friendship’s economy of encounter sidesteps the familiar debt/gift exchange that 
metaphysics exacts from both its friends and enemies, not to mention from those sen-
tient beings designated as Other. Instead, it generates a strangely emboldened, shared 
knowing, one that can be called a suspended attunement (or aliveness) to otherness, an 
aliveness without recourse to old-fashioned forms of master/slave power imbalances 
or splits between ‘self’ and the infamous capital ‘O’ Other. Suspended attunement to 
otherness does not (because it cannot) privilege an unknown being in any shape or 
form as either self or (an) Other or anything else yet to come. Nor does it mean to 
imply some kind of free-fall relativism or mid-fl ight bungee-jump hang, generating an 
‘in between’ or transitioning state of affairs. Leastwise is it romantic, though its irrup-
tions may launch over a thousand delicious plateaus. Friendship requires a wholly 
different logic, an ‘inhabited’ or ‘embodied’ logic of senses, emotions, libidinal econo-
mies, calculations, empathies and intentions, closer to the Roussean pitié (compassion/
self-love), the Socratic parrhēsia (truth) and its reinvention by Michel Foucault in his 
Courage of Truth, as epimeleia (the technologies of care).4
All this (and more) I learned from a wildly playful and sometimes dangerous horse, 
whose fi re-eyed, split-down-the-middle-brown-white face earned him the name Man-
hattan, corrupted from the Ojibwe Madweijwan: the ‘heard-fl owing’ of where the two 
rivers meet. Manhattan and I were not just friends; we were the very best of friends. It 
is to him – to this semi-feral buddy, this intelligent prankster of a mustang – that this 
chapter is dedicated.
learning how to listen
Required fi rst and foremost is an inhabited, wearable relation to plurality. This is a 
deeply post-Newtonian move which accepts, and indeed cherishes, the fact that two 
or more objects can, often do, and in this case (the case of listening) must, occupy the 
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same place at the same time without dominating or annihilating either object. In so 
accepting this kind of non-layering dimensional plurality, involved also is a deeply 
post-dialectic move. This is closer to a logic of techne, a ‘technology’ as Foucault 
would later name it, one that sidesteps the abyssal logics of a thesis/anti-thesis tran-
scendence (quasi or otherwise), with its attending excluded middles, castrated Lacks, 
and overrated Phalluses.5 There is no sublation, no synthesis, no Telos, no ground 
or goal. At best, there is a kind of synaesthesic intensity, a tremble, one could say, 
that ‘tunes in’ to each other’s multidimensional, ever-spreading half-circles of curios-
ity, empathy, attraction, even fear without, in so doing, passing judgement. This is a 
kind of multi-tonal, multi-coloured, multi-sensory present tense in-difference to each 
other’s being here, now; a kind of suspended, groundless awareness, which, in being 
without ground enables an openness to the unexpected: a listening-tremble that takes 
note without knowing (the why). This non-verbal ‘gut-feeling’ embodied cognition 
enables, in its why-lessness, an oddly territorialised, shared present, a kind of trans-
portable ‘safe-house’ erected at the very moment of suspended awareness. Differently 
stated, one could say that this form of listening offers, paradoxically, unconditional 
sanctuary, irrespective of motive, moral standing, commitment or drive. Kierkegaard 
names this unconditional paradoxical non-judgemental sanctuary: faith.6 Devoid of 
its religious trappings, we might better understand it as an ecology of accompanying, 
a kind of non-judgemental ‘being-with’: the unconditional heard-fl owing-openness 
where the two rivers meet.
I fi rst saw Manhattan whilst speeding in a black two-seater sports car over an 
open four-lane super-highway in that part of the country where diamond shaped deer 
signs gently dot the landscape, forewarning, in muted colours of mustard and black, 
imminent death or destruction to one or more mobile parties should their paths cross. 
He was a beautiful beast, though the hapless rider he was dragging across the four 
lanes probably thought less of his beauty at that exact moment. With one foot slipped 
through the stirrup, the other fl apping in the wind, it was a minor miracle that both 
horse and rider made it across without serious injury. So when a large hand-painted 
sign suddenly appeared at the side of the road boasting a daunting 15,000 hectares of 
unspoiled Crown land with undulating hills, forests, secret coves and natural fences 
over which one could sail at a trot, a canter or full throttle gallop; when splashed 
across that battered sign, the words ‘fantastic western trail-ride for all you weary 
travellers young and old – no experience necessary!’ came into focus, the tiny nerve 
endings at the base of my pineal gland did a little dance of recognition. The promise 
of Paradise beckoned to me across the asphalt spits like the proverbial Sirens’ songs 
to unblocked ears. I was a member of that tribe, so when the exit appeared, I took it.
As it turns out, Paradise reveals itself in a variety of forms. A pock-marked, lazily 
winding, thin slice of a road eventually opened onto what could only be described as a 
kind of soup kitchen for homeless horses, twenty-six to be exact. Twenty-seven if one 
counted Manhattan who had sprung into view from a completely different entrance, 
sweaty and snorting, with a screaming, angry rider in tow. Mud splodges everywhere, 
rusted corrugated roofs atop MDF stables, all in varying states of disrepair. Spotted 
in the middle distance were a half-acre of paddocks, with barbed wire fencing replac-
ing wooden railings that had been chewed into oblivion. A goat, several dogs, and a 
couple of cats were doing hospital rounds, making certain the few sentient beings still 
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locked in their stalls due to illness or injury were now on their way to recovery. An 
Annie-get-your-gun lookalike, fashioned in checked shirt, tasselled deer jacket, rodeo 
chaps and fi lthy dirty boots, in one seamless movement marched over to Manhattan, 
grabbed the reins, told him in no uncertain terms ‘Quit it!’, helped the furious, humili-
ated, well-heeled young-ish woman off the saddle, and fl atly announced: ‘Manhattan’s 
a dangerous horse – with those he don’t like’, narrowing her eyes beadily at the rider, 
who was in turn shouting lawsuits and closures. Without missing a beat, Doppel-
ganger Annie looked directly at me and, just as matter-of-factly, demanded: ‘Do you 
like the look of this horse? I charge very reasonable stable rates and you can have him 
for the cost of his feed. Otherwise he will be carted off to a glue factory.’ The white 
of Manhattan’s rebellious eye against the black of his wild mane gave him a certain 
unstable look at the best of times. It was fair to say, though, that perhaps the urban 
punk-blonde hair framed against thick black-eyeliner lids and a leather-clad body gave 
off a similar impression. Certainly, at that very moment, we acknowledged a familiar 
something about each other – a hunger, an impatience, a fl icker of fear, a raw compas-
sion, a not fi tting in, a fl ight from boredom – whatever it was (perhaps all these and 
more), it could safely be said that here emerged a tangle of unexpected gut recognition, 
a strangely satiating tremble, a glitching sting, as trembles of this nature so often do, 
right at the base of one’s throat and chest. An affi rmation of sorts, a ‘yes-saying’ if ever 
there was one.
Thus, albeit tentatively and completely by surprise, began our fi fteen-year friendship.
holding counsel (the gift)
The very kernel of a sentient encounter – this dimensionally plural, inhabited, here 
and now ‘yes-saying’ of attunement – surfs the fl ight-lines of proximity and distance 
without, in so surfi ng, bifurcating those trembled and entangled waves into classical 
tropes of dominance and submission (or, to attend to canonical divisions, intellect as 
rationality v nature as sense). This listening-encounter, whose philosophical grammar 
instead enables one to re-think thinking as a more practical-prosaic techne rather than 
an activity-game of two halves, invigorates everything it touches with both an indiffer-
ence to the ‘out there’ whilst, instantaneously making room for it. This ‘making room’ 
simultaneously acknowledges an immediate and intimate sharing of space with and 
amongst those beings with whom the encounter will have drawn into its mix.
A delicate, discursive bridge over which communication intensities are exchanged 
either on purpose or by accident or by some combination thereof, this ‘making room’ 
encounter forms a strangely durable environ of privacy, of community, of exclusion, of 
intimacy, of embodiment and exchange all in one go. A ‘connection’ able to invigorate 
without prying, able to acknowledge without judgement, able to call fellow travellers 
to its atmosphere without, in so calling, setting in motion any particular way for-
ward or back. A dwelling or clearing, call it what one may, this multiple-singularity 
encounter enables a kind of ecology of space to take shape, to take speed, pace, step, 
stride, run; even take leap, often without moving an inch. In this way, the attuned 
beings of encounter can (and do) begin their thaw of identity politics; can and do 
begin to disrobe identity itself – sidestepping the proper-noun etiquette of universal, 
object-oriented concepts, in favour of more mellifl uous, ephemeral, improper, fuzzy 
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logic attractors: the subjunctive’s infi nitely redrawn anti-infi nitive ‘-be’, the gerund’s 
ergonomic nod to vitality and movement ‘-ing’, the adjective’s paradoxically fuzzy but 
pin-pointing ‘-ish’.7
In this context, a second technology of friendship can now be explored. Born of 
and by attunement, a kind of narrative, slice of life wellness shelter of sorts, a dwelling-
house spa without the black and white bureaucratic interferences of identity code 
enforcers, the story (one could say, ‘our story’) now emerges in its minor key.8 Making 
a nod towards Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s restaging of the grand narrative, 
one could say that the listening-encounter enables a loosely structured narrative to 
take place, a slice or minor form of a story, whose ‘telling’ captures the strange radi-
cal mattering of a not-quite-here, not-quite-not-here (but here and there, nevertheless) 
differently embodied viva voce. The ability to mould this strangely materialised multi-
dimensional embodied-disembodied live voice, at once a ‘telling’ and a ‘calling’, whilst 
simultaneously being a ‘listening-encounter’, forms, in its telling, calling and listening 
an intensive fabric of a pluralised now, of a life, shared.
This impersonal-personal sharing of life’s creative genealogy/ies, Walter Benjamin 
singles out as the dying art of story making.9 This is an art that was and remains an 
underappreciated but critically important way to communicate (or perhaps just com-
mune) with the out-there/in-there/out-side/in-side/no-side/otherwise-side, elsewhere 
‘bridge’ in all its fuzziness and complexity, dizzying dimensionalities, fi re, boredom 
and debris – and to do so without need for interpretation, metrics or explanation. 
Story-making as the triangulated ability to grasp the listening-encounter, to be grasped 
by it and to pass it on; story-making as an informal cartography of how one comes to 
know, invent or discover what one can be or become; story-making as the ecce homo 
of everyday life; story-making, as Benjamin would so prosaically observe, as an exqui-
site elixir to life itself.10 For a story might offer a moral, a good feeling, an unfettered 
placeholder for a daydream not yet dreamt; it might offer a way to forget the immedi-
ate or, quite the reverse, might allow one to plunge into the centre of it all, right into 
the centre of some miserable black-hole internal cry of despair. It might have a ‘good 
ending’ or no ending of which to speak. But whatever else this slice of connection, 
this so-called listening encounter might or might not offer, in order to hear it, a differ-
ent ear would be required: one that is ‘itself’ a communal, heterogeneous, fractalised 
plurality; an ear whose very multiplicity involves, indeed requires, a relational logic 
of sense quite distinct from that born of zero-sum games. A kind of well-beingness 
adventure-ear, this listening-encounter, this mani-fold ear; one that can be named, as 
Jean-Luc Nancy so eloquently put it: ‘the event of being singular plural’.11
One fi nds that with the event of being singular plural, there is no totalising ‘whole’ 
per se. No need to divide the pie into fragments or fractions; no need to focus on 
receiver or sender. At best, it is a call for the ear(s) to be lent or bent or just ‘be’. For 
this kind of hearing has nothing to do with the need to exchange information and even 
less to do with a need for ‘action-point’ solutions, so often the love child of corporate-
managed grand narratives and cognitive behaviour therapy. Instead, this listening-call-
ing-telling slice of life bridge-making ‘enables’: it enables a certain multiple-singularity 
of the ‘being-with now’ to take place and even take its rightful place; it enables the 
generating of shared counsel, with its purposeless generosity stoked by the immediacy 
of caring indifference. Holding counsel, in its turn, enables a certain mindfulness to 
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emerge, one that sidesteps reason without being unreasonable, one that sidesteps logic 
without being illogical. One could say that this is nothing more nor less than gift-giv-
ing at its best: at its most quiet, most gentle level, a pleasure gift, a magic garden gift, a 
telling/sharing/hearing secret bridge-building gift that, at the very moment of ‘gifting’, 
at the very moment of ‘counsel’, enables one to ‘just be’ communally alone together. 
Foucault named this gifting of the communal alone together ‘just be’ (-ing) as an aspect 
of epimelia heatou, the shared technology of caring.12 Walter Benjamin simply called 
it: wisdom, the ability to weave counsel into the fabric of real life.13
adventure (sharing the secret)
There are many ways to weave counsel into the fabric of life. Manhattan was particu-
larly adept at it, indeed legendary, as I would come to learn, and not just through my 
own association with him, but by speaking with the Elders living on a nearby ‘First 
Nations Reserve’, the blandly inhumane appellation of forced relocation ‘homelands’ 
for Ojibwe, Cree and other indigenous peoples.14 For being the prankster that he was, 
Manhattan often fi gured out ways to leap over his waist-high stall in the dead of night 
and roam the landscape at will, looking for the infi nite whatever, spurred on by vary-
ing degrees of curiosity and a stubborn itch to be free. This meant that our morning 
approaches to greet each other frequently took place in the fi elds and, just as regularly, 
would entail vain attempts on my part to catch him using a loose halter in one hand 
and the lure of a carrot or apple in the other. I came to learn that when Manhattan had 
managed to have one of those wild roam-the-countryside nights, he was particularly 
diffi cult to catch the next morning and no amount of running towards him, away from 
him or alongside with or without treats, would work. Until ready to be caught, this 
towards, away and alongside often became one of our more common rituals, a game, 
in and of itself. Trembles on his fl anks, pricked forward ears, a shaking of the mane 
and snorting of the fresh hard early morning air as he bolted round the fi elds meant 
he was having a whale of a time at my expense, enjoying, to the max, his version of 
just horsing around. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that the nature of our being-
with-together always entailed some kind of ‘horseplay’ with no real agenda or goal to 
hand other than a loose agreement to explore the time-space continuum, searching for 
the whatever, wherever it would take us.
Without putting too fi ne a point on it, then, a third technology of friendship can 
now be glimpsed: this is no less than the promise of play (whilst engaging in play); 
the promise of adventure, big or small, whilst journeying together with no necessary 
or exacting purpose in mind. Moreover, it could be said that these ‘whatever’ play-
time-adventures as often as not served as grist for communal self-invention stories, a 
kind of joint mindless-mindfulness holding of counsel in a minor but collective key. A 
suspended need for possessive individualism, while enabling instead a loosely drawn 
‘us’ to take place – and doing so without losing the sensual self in the process; with-
out losing, that is to say, the laughter self, the smelly self, the out of breath self, the 
troubled self, the ‘I don’t give a damn’ self. All the selves fl itting in and out of this ‘us’ 
playtime adventure, forming in its wake, a kind of sturdy intensity, a heterogeneous 
multidimensional intensity, one that enabled memories and/or inventions of selves to 
make room for more stories, deeper stories, ‘infi nite whatever stories’, now folding in 
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on themselves to create the baselines for this non-totalising ‘us’ of friendship. Playtime 
adventures often included daring the other to inhabit the (im)possible manners and 
intentions of a scout or explorer; to be or become the reckless renegade or poet or 
some combination thereof, and doing so whilst cantering amidst some unknown set 
of pines, or waterfalls or streams, uphill and down, in a single direction for hours at 
a go. On one occasion a silver-backed coyote steered our run through heather fi elds, 
making certain we did not go near her young; on another, a brown bear with a foul 
disposition and a putrid body odour of rotting meat to match ambled across our path, 
sparking fear and, as it would happen, the rather misguided decision by Manhattan 
and I to stop dead in our tracks, turn right around, and against all the advice books 
on the matter, fl ee.
Every now and then we would take a few fi ne provisions of, say, honey, peanut but-
ter, carrots, a skinful of water and a bottle of wine, and, after riding for a few hours, 
fi nd a good spot to settle – whereupon Manhattan would drop down, fold himself 
onto his legs, and I would read aloud to the both of us, leaning my back against his 
fl ank and using the long grass as our communal lounge. Sometimes we would invite 
Decca the Doberman-Collie cross to join our escapades, though because of her unfor-
tunate penchant for chasing porcupines (with the end result being a face full of quills), 
invitations to her were kept to a minimum. A relaxed energy fl ow of pleasure, a quiet 
joy of just ‘being-with’ together, attuned to an atmosphere thick with the sound buzz 
of unidentifi able insects or the throaty kee-eeeee-arr utterance from soaring red-hawk 
birds of prey, a soundscape often punctured with a padded crack by an unknown 
sentient being scrambling over fallen branches and moss-puckered decay; well, it was 
during one of those madly picturesque slice-of-time semi-silent communication adven-
tures that our friendship was, quite unexpectedly, tested to its limit and, quite possibly, 
tested beyond that limit.
I would like to say that it is this test that demarcates the fourth technology of 
friendship. It is the test called: trust. This is not just any old trust; this is not a trust 
born from mastery or authority or, dare it be said, formal education per se. It is a trust 
that can only emerge on the playing fi elds themselves – on the playing fi elds of a being-
with togetherness so described; of, that is to say, a two-way energy fl ow of attunement, 
adventure and the logics of sense.
Although mid-November, when the temperatures in that part of the world often 
dipped far below zero, the day had started rather brisk but sunny and not overly cold, 
somewhere in the upper teens Celsius. But from the moment we found our clearing, 
from the moment we started to arrange ourselves in the usual way, it was apparent 
something was afoot. An odd, restless shudder ran down Manhattan’s spine as soon 
as I had dismounted; a hard, disturbed pawing on the ground with the right forward 
hoof; a refusal to relax. From fi rst glance I could notice nothing else out of the ordi-
nary; no bears, no coyotes, no nothing, not even the local illegal hunters with their pot-
shot orange hats and beer belly stupidities. The weather was beginning to turn mean, 
so perhaps Manhattan was quite rightly expressing his doubts about the length of time 
we would have to relax. But then I spotted something in the middle distance, some-
thing I realised Manhattan had already known was there: a makeshift grave, fairly 
recently dug, with, as it would happen, a torn pair of briefs and shirt stuffed under a 
nearby bush. About six months previously, there had been a number of posters dotted 
along the perimeter of the wood concerning a missing young woman feared to have 
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been abducted, probably sexually assaulted and, as nothing had come to light in the 
months that followed, feared to have been murdered. And here was a makeshift grave. 
And here were telltale signs of something quite seriously out of place. To make matters 
worse, I was not exactly certain where we were, having ridden, as per usual, for a few 
hours in some vague direction of the sun’s movements without taking any real note of 
the journey. And now this friendly sun had been replaced by chilling rain, and now this 
gentle clearing had been replaced with fears of gruesome tragedy, and now lightning 
bolts began shooting down from the heavens as though Thor himself took hold of our 
world and, taking great aim at any moving object in an open fi eld, dared us to proceed.
Remounting, my initial thought was to camoufl age amongst the shrubs until the 
worst of the storm passed, but as we might be stuck for hours in ever worsening 
conditions, Manhattan’s irritable demeanour suggested a second option: outrun the 
lightning bolts and trust him to get us home. After all, I had witnessed his remarkable 
track record on motorways, with an equally remarkable sense of direction. Leaning 
low on his neck and holding fast to his wild mane, Manhattan and I took fl ight. ‘Get 
us home, my friend,’ I body-spoke to him. And that is precisely what he did, albeit not 
quite the ‘home’ I had in mind. For while we outraced the lightning with the agility 
of a springbok, we made it all the way to Curve Lake 35, the Ojibwe’s land reserve, 
fourteen kilometres north of where I thought we were meant to be.
This is how I learned just how well-loved and legendary was my friend Manhattan. 
For no one was surprised to see him; no one was surprised to learn that he had led 
me to that grim burial plot and would in time lead the police back to it; no one was 
surprised that he would choose to save our lives against the brutal storm and would 
do so by outpacing the gods.
radical pitié (superpositional empathy)
In 1755, Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously answered the question ‘what is the origin 
of inequality?’ with the acid retort: private property and people ignorant enough to 
believe in its civilising potential.15 He argued that this acceptance/belief was based on 
an even more simplistic view of ‘human nature’: the confl ation of a now common-
sense notion that self-preservation should be equated, ipso facto, with the ability (read: 
success) or lesser ability (read: failure) simply to acquire, and then consumptively to 
amass anything lying to hand or beyond. Starting with shelter and basic foodstuffs for 
oneself and/or one’s nearest and dearest, but quickly encompassing all that could be 
had via bartering, selling, inheritance, warfare, gambling, hoarding, outright thievery 
or a combination thereof, Rousseau argued that this form of self-preservation was 
only a thinly disguised nastiness of self-interested greed. As he put it, this nastiness 
was nothing less than a so-called new intelligence, a philosophy born via cold calcula-
tion and cunning reason, which in the name of civilisation, snuffed out the breath of 
life itself; snuffed out, that is to say, non-judgemental compassionate empathy, or, in 
a word, pitié.
Were it even true that pitié is no more than a feeling, which puts us in the place of 
the sufferer . . . this truth would have no other consequence than to confi rm my 
argument. Compassion must, in fact, be the stronger, the more the animal behold-
ing any kind of distress identifi es himself with the animal that suffers. Now, it is 
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plain that such identifi cation must have been much more perfect in a state of nature 
than it is in a state of reason. . . . It is reason which turns man’s mind back upon 
itself, and divides him from everything that could disturb or affl ict him. It is phi-
losophy that isolates him, and bids him say, at sight of the misfortunes of others: 
‘Perish if you will, I am secure.’ . . . A murder may with impunity be committed 
under his window; he has only to put his hands to his ears and argue a little with 
himself, to prevent nature, which is shocked within him, from identifying itself 
with the unfortunate sufferer.16
Book II of the Discourses on Inequality subsequently develops the argument, indeed 
plea, to reconnect with this non-judgemental pitié, which he further develops beyond 
the complex ability to see, hear, voice, feel, witness the suffering of others. Distinct 
from its English counterpart ‘pity’, with its Dickensian undertones of a ‘this-could-
not-happen-to-me’ superiority and a rush to infantilise the sufferer, Rousseau’s pitié 
requires a return to frontline compassion. This is a particular form of truth-telling, a 
particular form of witnessing, that requires in this return, a different self, a sensuous 
self; a self quite aware of pain and distress; a self quite aware of the cruelty of the 
wound, any wound. This is a self, argues Rousseau, quite divorced from the logics of 
privitisation, accumulation, captains of industry, and war. Not quite the resurrection 
of a ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’, this is a form of self-love 
(amour propre) forged out of one’s gut decision not to turn away, precisely because 
one knows, viscerally, what the other is going through and, in that knowing, that 
embodied/bodily knowing, refusing to forget.
To say this slightly differently, pitié – the ‘putting oneself in the sufferer’s shoes’ – is 
not only a non-judgemental act of empathy and compassion; it is the refuelling, the 
re-remembering of one’s own self-respect, one’s own self-esteem. This double-bind, 
refl exive move holds out the promise to create and maintain a community rooted 
in a certain type of kindness and generosity of spirit, one which has been for far 
too long, antagonistically, indeed, brutally undervalued and repressed via various 
property-accumulation/self-preservation ‘civilising’ techniques, as remarked above.17 
In Rousseau’s conceptual treasure chest, this move was, of course, premised on clas-
sical liberalism, which, albeit foregrounding crucial principles such as the separation 
of Church and State or the importance of change as the basis of society, did so by 
also accepting the anthropocentric conclusion that society was itself comprised of a 
collection of autonomous individuals who had mythically come together whilst in 
that nascent state (of nature). In so coming together, an agreement to leave the state 
of nature via the (equally mythical) social covenant was now somehow raised and 
secured in the name of a new social contract. This contract, which promised so much 
and delivered so little, established instead the kind of deeply uncivilised civil society 
that we have to this day. ‘Man is born free,’ Rousseau famously lamented, ‘and every-
where he is in chains.’18
Given this unrelenting state of affairs, a collective form of pitié could only arise 
given the rather unlikely probability that each individual might somehow throw off 
their chains, engage this double-binding embodied knowledge of amour propre and 
do so en masse. A probability so low that perhaps this is why many before Rousseau, 
and so many more since, have voiced that erstwhile cry, ‘O my Friends, there are no 
friends.’
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But what if it could be otherwise; what if, without having to invoke a homoge-
neous and rather starry-eyed version of a state of nature, we could approach this by 
resituating the very notion of pitié without its attendant (mythical) reverse moves to 
an elsewhere over-the-rainbow dwelling ‘outside’ the social? What if we could enable a 
kind of amour propre emerging from some ‘where’ or some ‘thing’ quite different than 
a personal 1–2–1 sighting of the sufferer within a proscribed boundary, be it natural, 
outside the social or in our dreams? Here one must take pause to reconsider, particu-
larly in light of the four technologies of friendship thus far developed.
For if one releases from their conceptual and practical arsenal the anthropocentric 
notion of the ‘individual’ per se and the zero-sum property game to which that indi-
vidual has for so long been consigned; if one begins to weave together the approaches 
to being (as sentient or otherwise) a ‘becoming-with’ process in a so-called ‘minor key’, 
forged at/in/through the moment of listening-hearing-telling adventure-encounters; if, 
that is to say, the very ‘ground’ on which social agency is made manifest, is no lon-
ger – if ever it was – reduced to the infamous ‘State of Nature vs. Civil Society’ linear 
time-space positionalities; if the very meaning of life itself is closer to a ‘becoming-x’ 
forged on de-terroritorialised playing fi elds of attuned encounters, then, apart from 
many other consequences, be they practical, political, mathematical, economic, aes-
thetic or theoretical, a very different notion of social agency and, alongside it, a rather 
different form of empathy, compassion, indeed ‘self-love’ emerges. This is one born 
out of a nomadic, de-territorialised event – an event that is ‘itself’ a ‘multiple singu-
larity’ emerging from and reconstituted over and again by the pluralised intra-action 
of entangled encounter. This being-with encounter, this multiple-singularity intensity, 
able to be reconfi gured in the ‘here and now’ irrespective of proximity or distance, 
irrespective, that is to say, of a common, territorialised location, is both enabling and 
at the same time, an ethical proposition. To use Karen Barad’s phrasing, it generates 
a ‘response-ability’, the ability to respond, to be accountable; it enables the ethical to 
take shape, to take place, to make the leap.19
Naming this ethical agency ‘agential realism’, Barad puts it thus:
With each intra-action, the manifold of entangled relations is reconfi gured. And so 
consequentiality, responsibility, and accountability take on entirely new valences. 
There are no singular causes. And there are no individual agents of change. Respon-
sibility is not ours alone. And yet our responsibility is greater than it would be if it 
were ours alone. Responsibility entails an ongoing responsiveness to the entangle-
ments of self and other, here and there, now and then.20
I want to call this being-with encounter and the ethical response-abilities it enables 
a ‘radical matter’: a radical matter imbued with the logics of sense, no longer paral-
leling the propositions and deductions of a Newtonian physics; no longer repeating 
ad nauseum the conceptual/political inadequacies of bounded-terriorialised bodies 
or states; no longer demarcating the human being from any other being, sentient 
or otherwise. Perhaps one could push the logic even further and say that radical 
matter bears a family resemblance, as it were, to Roger Penrose’s reconsideration of 
Niels Bohr’s ‘spooky action at a distance’, the throwaway remark by Albert Einstein 
in 1927 dismissing what until then was unproven: that entanglement can and does 
occur faster than the speed of light, irrespective of its ‘where’.21 This far-reaching 
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simultaneous positionality is ‘superpositionality’, writ both tiny-tiny and grandiose 
in an instant. Perhaps one could make the leap, then, that radical matter is no more 
(nor less) than a super-positional event, the instantaneous entanglement exchange of 
information faster than the speed of light, where proximity and distance no longer 
impede the enactment of entangled response-ability. A quantum encounter of the wild 
science kind, if ever there was one.
With this shift to a radical mattering, let us return to the possibility of pitié, now 
eased away from the individuated ‘natural’ agency to which Rousseau had given it, 
and resituated instead via the nomadic ‘groundless grounds’ of a superpositional 
encounter/event. At the very least, one could say that its ‘double-bind’ amour propre 
re-emerges as non-individuated, non-localised response-ability. One could say, further, 
that this is a heterogeneic, fractalised response-ability, a simultaneously ruptured/
entangled non-localised emergence of the ‘whatever-x’. One could say even further 
that this ‘whatever-x’ folds back on itself (on its multiple ‘itself’) to create in that 
(mani-) fold moment, reiterative de-territorialised intensities, paradoxical instanta-
neous, surface intensities, which, in their superpositional entanglement ‘enable’. Of 
the many things enabled is the event of sensuous amour propre, a moment of self-to-
self generosity, a renewed sense of being, a mark of respect. It is a collaborative, mul-
tidimensional empathy neither ‘given’ nor ‘received’ by individual beings per se, but 
productive and enabling nevertheless; an epemelia heatou, whose exchange/circulation 
economy produces the generosity of respect, not only without losing the love of self in 
the process, but by strengthening it. I want to call this: radical pitié, the fi fth technol-
ogy of friendship.
Now picture a moonless winter evening, where the provenance of light emanates 
more from the deep-snow-encrusted ground rather than the sky itself. Now picture 
the bewitching hour of midnight, strewn with twenty-seven horses, some with and 
some without riders, their breaths white cold against the frozen air. Here we were, 
a somewhat motley crew of sentient beings, whose friendships had long ago crossed 
the blood-brain barrier. Midnight snow runs were of course the most thrilling, moon-
less ones; all the more so, perhaps, because they were the most dangerous. We would 
assemble at the farthest northern trail, torches strapped to helmets for those wearing 
one. Everywhere the crunch-squelch rhythm of hooves slicing the thick atmosphere of 
a profoundly invigorating silence, with undulating lanterns blinking as walking geared 
up to the trot, then a quick shift into canter and then, in a fi t of moonless madness, to 
high-voltage galloping. Those without riders would sometimes lead the way. And this 
is precisely how we came upon a gelding lying in the middle of a fi eld, who, judging 
by the no longer free-fl owing blood which at some point had shot out from an hor-
rifi cally torn leg, meant that he must have lain there dying and then dead for at least 
a few hours or more.
And then the extraordinary happened. As the riders silently moved away, the rider-
less horses remained. Out of the blackened horizon from points unknown, a few other 
mustangs joined the group, now numbering around twenty. In what seemed to go on 
for quite some time, they kept encircling their fallen comrade, and once forming that 
circle, stood stock still. Paying their respects to him and each other, it was then all over, 
dispersing as silently as they had come.
‘Friendship as a way of life’, Foucault would say.22 But perhaps it is more accurate 
to say: Friendship as life.
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